PANEL DISCUSSION ON INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES: PROBLEMS OF
ENFORCEABLE NORMS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Myron H. Nordquist *
This panel's scope of discussion covers norms as well as
compliance regarding international environmental crimes during both times
of peace and armed conflict. This is a huge subject, as indicated by the
comments of my colleagues, which was largely directed to the past and
current state of international law for environmental crimes. The task
assigned to me on this panel is to focus more on the future. The views that
follow are presented in a personal capacity. I am not an official
spokesman for the United States government, although I work for it.
Bearing in mind that seventy percent of the earth's surface is
covered by salt water, it is appropriate to begin by noting that many
principles and rules to protect the international marine environment in
peacetime are found in the Third United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea. Articles 213 through 222 deal specifically with enforcement
related to marine pollution violations from land-based sources, the seabed,
the atmosphere, dumping and the like. Criminal violations of rules based
on the Convention's norms may trigger criminal responsibility and
enforcement is carried out under domestic law based on nationality, flag
state, or territorial jurisdiction. Detailed regulations for commercial vessel
operators are developed through the International Maritime Organization
where work is underway on many complex marine environment issues.
Environmental crimes committed by commercial vessel operators in the
world's oceans are typically enforced through the flag state. There are
instances, however, where the coastal-state enforcement jurisdiction is
based on its control over fisheries, petroleum, or by conditioning the entry
of vessels into its ports. This latter nexus is particularly effective for
enforcing vessel standards intended to protect the marine environment. A
recent regional agreement on straddling stocks and tunas, nudging
enforcement against third-state vessels for overfishing on the high seas
beyond the 200 mile exclusive economic zone, is a modest step beyond
traditional law. The underlying jurisdictional innovation follows from the
customary law obligation, which is embodied in the 1982 Law of the Sea
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Convention, and by which the flag states ensure that their vessels fishing
on the high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of regionally agreed
rules, whether or not the flag state is a party to the relevant regional
agreement. If overfishing on the high seas proper is an international
environmental crime, and it certainly can be, we may conclude that
criminal enforcement to ensure better accountability is improved in this
limited, but important area of international law. The principle reflected in
this jurisdictional innovation may even contain the seeds for discovering
more effective enforcement of environmental rules in non-high seas areas.
Unfortunately, the bad news is that the United States is only one of three
parties to the new agreement on straddling stocks and highly migratory
species. The good news is that the world's largest high-seas fishing
nation, the Peoples Republic of China, plans to sign the Convention in the
near future.
Turning from the sea to the air in peacetime, we can expect any
pertinent law with respect to civil aircraft involved with international
environmental law and with respect to civil aircraft involved with
international environmental crimes to be developed in the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The conventional rules governing
this area are largely found in the Tokyo, the Hague, and Montreal
Conventions. These Conventions, along with customary international law,
provide what can only be fairly described as a rudimentary system of
The imperfect
sanctions for civil aviation crimes during peacetime.
enforcement regime for civil aviation crimes in general, has been
dramatically demonstrated in terrorism cases. Compliance on safety
matters, on the other hand, is excellent, being based on well-defined and
widely recognized international law rules.
At this juncture it is worth recalling that both warships and
military aircraft enjoy sovereign immunity. This fundamental precept of
international law is reflected both in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
and in the various ICAO conventions.
Conventional and customary international law norms governing
environment crimes during peacetime on land territory occur within the
jurisdiction of sovereign states. Accordingly, they are only effectively
enforced when these international norms are incorporated into the domestic
authorities who base their actions on the classic jurisdiction exercised by a
sovereign state over its territory or nationals. This is by far the most
significant and pervasive interface between international environmental
norms and their enforcement. To the extent that deficiencies exist in
states' agreeing on legal norms that are equivalent to international
environmental crimes, and in taking effective criminal enforcement in their
sovereign territory during peacetime, suggestions for corrections are
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properly addressed to generating greater political will by sovereign states.
And to misuse a line from Mark Twain to make a point, the reports
announcing the death of state sovereignty are greatly exaggerated.
In reviewing the international normative rules pertaining to
environmental crimes, a curious pattern emerged. It became evident that
there seemed to be greater agreement among states and experts about the
general principles that apply during hostilities than during peacetime. At
the same time, the contrary appears with respect to the enforcement regime
for environmental criminal violations: enforcement seems to be more
effective in peacetime than during armed conflict. This state of affairs
may explain why the text of a statute for an International Criminal Court
due to be finalized in 1998 by a United Nations preparatory Committee is
expected to be limited to core crimes. Genocide will then be whether the
international environmental crime at issue is a war crime. In addition,
expectations are that enforcement of the Court's judgments will depend
upon cooperation from national courts.I
With the foregoing observations in mind, let us focus on possible
improvements in the legal regime governing international environmental
crimes during armed conflict. The comments which follow concentrate on
both normative standards and on enforcement mechanisms.
A sensible beginning point is to ask whether there is sufficient law
concerning international environmental crimes during hostilities and follow
on with a discussion about enforcement.
My fellow panelists have
addressed that question by citing an impressive array of conventional and
customary law rules and principles that proscribe international criminal
conduct against the environment during armed conflict. A similar detailing
of existing international law on this subject is contained in joint
memorandum prepared by Jordan and the United States for the United
Nations'General Assembly in 1993.2 It appears that the prevailing expert
opinion is to answer the question about the adequacy of substantive law in
the affirmative. Support for this view was borne out when the General
Assembly urged compliance with the international rules spelled out in the
memorandum and endorsed their incorporation into the military manuals of
members.
To facilitate common understanding of the norms and their
practical implementation, the International Committee of the Red Cross
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even drafted guidelines for military manuals and instructions on the
protection of the environment during armed conflict.3
The United States position, that is supported by other responsible
governments and many leading experts, is that the substantive law on
international environmental crimes is adequate for now. A leading expert
from the Office of Legal Adviser in the United States Department of State,
J. Ashley Roach, identifies nine specific customary law provisions
pertaining to the protection of the environment during armed conflict.4 He
cites articles 22, 23, and 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, articles 53,
55, and 147 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, and among other
customary law principles, military necessity, proportionality and humanity.
Note is made of articles 35 and 55 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949
Convention adopted in 1977 and a number of other possibly applicable
rules.
The idea is that international law rules are adequate and that the
international community ought to place its emphasis on the education of
military personnel and on the dissemination of existing legal obligations
under international law. From this policy perspective, the real problem is
seen not as a lack of norms, but rather as a lack of enforcement for
environment crimes committed during armed hostilities.
Pertinent questions raised by this approach are how much effort
states ought to expend on promoting international enforcement to protect
the environment, and more importantly, how much effort they will exert?
The painful comparison that immediately comes to mind is that
international enforcement to prosecute individuals indicted for murdering
groups of humans in mass killings is woefully lacking.
Protracted
philosophical debates about the relative weight to be accorded
anthropocentric or inherent values regarding the environment have their
place. But the outcome on that issue does not resolve the practical
question of how much limited political capital a nation should use on trying
to improve enforcement for international environmental crimes, whatever
the underlying value. Only die-hard inherent value fans would quibble
with the observation that crimes against the environment per se involve
less direct and immediate human suffering and loss of life than do the
crimes of genocide or democide. Abstract arguments, even when true,
that humanity will perish if it neglects the environment fade in value
intensity when compared with the evil slaughter of innocent people now.
Governments must prioritize their foreign policy goals and make choices
3.
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that husband their limited political capital. A political leader who pushes
for enforcement against murderers harder than for enforcement against
polluters is unlikely to be faulted. Stated plainly, if Saddam Hussein is not
brought to justice for murdering Kurdish badies, how much effort should
governments expend attempting to try him for crimes against the
environment? Is the international community likely to pursue indicting
him for killing plants when it does not indict him for killing thousands of
innocent humans? The attitude in the real world toward enforcement
priorities is illustrated in the current Bosnia conflict. So far, the leadership
in the North Atlantic Council lacks the political will to carry out a clear
legal obligation by its Member States to search for individuals known to be
in IFOR's area of operations and who are indicted by the international
criminal tribunal for grave war crimes.
Even if international
environmental war criminals ought to be tried, is there any evidence that
they will be in the near future?
Despite the weight of the opinion cited above, I do not see the
problem as being limited to just enforcement. My judgment is that the
substantive law governing international environmental crimes is inadequate
for the post Cold War era. As one of the eminent authorities on war
crimes recently observed: "Governments have been exceedingly slow in
drafting law-of-war agreements, or even provisions, for protecting the
environment."- One basis for my skepticism stems from a lack of
confidence in the substantive norms themselves being adequate for
successful prosecution in an international criminal court where the
operative procedural presumption is that guilt must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt. As is well known, this is a high standard of proof. On
their face, the norms suffer from too often appearing as mere afterthoughts
scattered helter-skelter throughout conventions that were concluded before
modern outlooks arose that place an independent value on the
environment. In truth, many of the customary international law norms that
are cited by the experts as protections for the environment are, in reality,
protections against wanton destruction of non-combatant property. There
is quite a different legal concept that is motivated by markedly different
human values. In part due to these inadequacies, the meaning of key
definitions and textual terms regarding environmental crimes is often too
vague to meet the standards for criminal misconduct under either
substantive or procedural due process, as those concepts are generally
understood. Admittedly, the notion of due process itself is at an early
stage of development insofar as its use in an international criminal court
5.
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trial is concerned. But this fact simply makes it all the more important that
vague and ambiguous standards not be advanced prematurely. Critics will
be looking for openings, especially when the victim is the environment,
rather than dead groups of human beings. Fundamental fairness also
dictates genuine concern for the rights of the accused. Minimum due
process in criminal trials of any nature requires establishing that the
accused understood the rules he allegedly breached. Promoting respect for
the rule of law in the world is not enhanced if vague rules are treated as if
they were clear cut and are only enforced by the victors after winning the
conflict.
Assuming, for the sake of reasoned debate, that progressive
codification of the law, that is, that a consolidation and more precise
reformulation of international criminal norms to protect the environment
were desired, how might it be done?
It is recognized that an attempt to clarify norms runs the risk of
opening a Pandora's Box. Respect for the rule of law in this area is not
advanced if a good faith effort to create a forum for discussion on this
issue is seized upon as a pretext for opponents of weapons of mass
destruction to concentrate their efforts to foist unacceptable rules on nonconsenting states.
The mischief potential for overreaching by well
meaning, but sometimes over-zealous supporters of the environment is
well understood by experienced international negotiators. Suffice it to say,
it's bad enough for this area of international law that meaningful
international enforcement is lacking for acknowledged war crimes against
large groups of humans. Respect for law on a global scale will not be
enhanced and environmental protection goals not advanced by developing
a new set of criminal norms to protect the environment that will be notable
only for being universally ignored.
With the above caveats about the possibility of counterproductive
results in mind, I still believe that it is worthwhile to consider a
consolidation and clarification of the norms applicable to international
environmental crimes during armed conflict. Perhaps the day will come
when there will also be realistic grounds to expect better enforcement. If
it does arrive, this modest step would at least have the substantive law in a
better state of organization and international consensus than it is now.
Along these lines, one approach that may merit consideration is to ask the
International Law Commission to prepare a draft Protocol V to the 1980
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Step one should be to
condense the wordy title of this Convention.
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The Preamble to the Conventional Weapons Convention provides,
"it is prohibited to employ methods of warfare which are intended, or may
be expected, to cause wide spread, long term and severe damage to the
natural environment, reaffirming the need to continue the codification and
progressive development of the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict. "6
The Conventional Weapons Convention is thus seen as an umbrella
document that could provide the legal structure for a progressive
codification of the rules pertaining to international war crimes. This
proposition assumes that the terms of reference are strictly confined to a
good faith effort only to clarify existing international law. This must be
the limited mandate given to the International Law Convention. Use of the
Conventional Weapons Convention would provide no means for
enforcement beyond what states are already obligated to do as parties to an
international agreement. To the extent that codified norms reflecting
customary international law are embodied in the new Protocol V, then all
states are already obligated to abide by them. And for the customary law
rules to be true law, sovereign states must have manifested their
acceptance of the rules through state practice. The suggestion to consider
normative clarification and consolidation is therefore a modest one. It
ought not to be taken as a signal that enforcement will be improved by
creating a permanent, or even of an ad hoc, international judicial organ
specifically chartered to try environmental war crimes. The sole objective
of the new Protocol V would be to codify existing international law that
many government experts say is already clear enough.
Responsible governments and environmentalist activists ought to
share the objective of ensuring that there is little doubt about the existence
in international law of a common understanding of the applicable
substantive norms. Without that, convictions cannot be obtained beyond a
reasonabledoubt. After all, it will be members of the armed forces of the
responsible governments who will actually try to obey the law. They
deserve better than to be left with any doubt about what is and is not an
international environmental crime. After there is no room for meaningful
disagreement between experts on what constitutes crimes against the
international environment in the normative sense, world leaders will be
better positioned to turn to the task of making enforcement take place in
good faith and in accordance with due process and respect for the rule of
law.
6.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional

Weapons, Apr. 10, 1981, reprinted in JOSEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, 242

(1982).

